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THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL  
LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE 
 
Storm King Revisited:  
A View From the Mountaintop 
ALBERT K. BUTZEL* 
 
It is a privilege for me to be here this afternoon to deliver a 
lecture in honor of my mentor, Lloyd Garrison.  Hard as it is to 
believe, it was forty-five years ago, almost to the day, that I was 
summoned to Mr. Garrison’s office on the twelfth floor at 575 
Madison Avenue, handed an opinion issued two weeks earlier by 
what was then known as the Federal Power Commission (FPC), 
given two hours to read it, and asked to return to his office for an 
afternoon conference with the lawyers. 
It was by complete serendipity that I ended up in Mr. 
Garrison’s office that day in 1965.  When I had gone to Paul 
Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison six months earlier, I had 
agreed to do anything but litigation.  That day, however, there 
were no litigation associates available.  So I was commandeered 
from the corporate department to help on what became the Storm 
King case. 
That is what I am going to talk about today, but not by 
simply rehashing what is already well known.  I want to tell you 
 
* Albert K. Butzel is the principal of Albert K. Butzel Law Offices.  He has 
practiced law and led advocacy campaigns in New York City since 1965.  He 
litigated the Storm King case for 15 years until its conclusion.  This article and 
the underlying factual information were first presented at Pace University 
School of Law on April 15, 2010 as the Sixteenth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison 
Lecture on Environmental Law.  I want to thank Professor Nicholas Robinson 
for inviting me to deliver the Sixteenth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on 
Environmental Law.  I also want to thank my friend, Professor Oliver Houck, for 
the many insights he has given me regarding the Storm King case and 
environmental law in general.  Finally, I thank those who gave this Lecture 
before me, from whom I have drawn a number of the thoughts that I have 
offered in this year’s Lecture. 
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the story of the case, not just focus on the outcome.  And I want to 
give you my impression of where environmental litigation stands 
up today measured against the promise of the Storm King 
decision.1 
The first part of the story is about Lloyd Garrison.  To begin 
with, Lloyd was not a litigator.  His expertise lay in corporate and 
labor law.  A native of New York City, after graduating from 
Harvard College and Law School, he returned to the City in 1922, 
working at the law firm of Elihu Root, winner of the 1912 Nobel 
Peace Prize, who became Lloyd’s mentor.  Several years later, Mr. 
Garrison began his career in public service as Special Assistant to 
the U.S. Attorney General.  In 1932, he was appointed Dean of 
the University of Wisconsin Law School, transforming it over the 
next fourteen years into one of America’s top law schools.  During 
this time, he also served as the first Chairman of the National 
Labor Relations Board and later as its General Counsel.  He was 
a central figure on the War Labor Board and bore much of the 
burden of maintaining labor-management peace during the 
Second World War. After the War, he joined three other partners 
to form Paul Weiss.  In the ensuing twenty years, he had a 
distinguished career as a lawyer while also being heavily involved 
in matters of public interest.  Long interested in civil rights, he 
was president of the National Urban League from 1947 to 1952, 
and he represented Arthur Miller and Langston Hughes when 
they were summoned before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities.2  It was shortly after this that he suffered a 
 
 1. There are several excellent books that tell the Storm King story.  See, e.g., 
ALLAN R. TALBOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDSON: THE STORM KING CASE AND THE 
BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1972); FRANCES F. DUNWELL, THE HUDSON RIVER 
HIGHLANDS, 202-230 (1991); ROBERT H. BOYLE, THE HUDSON RIVER: A NATURAL 
AND UNNATURAL HISTORY 124-52 (1969).  Also well worth reading is OLIVER 
HOUCK, TAKING BACK EDEN: EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL CASES THAT CHANGED THE 
WORLD, 7-21 (2010).  An excellent collection of source materials relating to the 
Storm King case and other power plants on the Hudson was put together by 
Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod.  See THE HUDSON RIVER POWER PLANT 
SETTLEMENT: MATERIALS PREPARED FOR A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW AND THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. 
WITH SUPPORT FROM THE JOHN A. HARTFORD FOUNDATION, INC. (Ross Sandler & 
David Schoenbrod eds., 1981) [hereinafter SETTLEMENT MATERIALS]. 
2 See Lee A. Daniels, Lloyd K. Garrison, Lawyer, Dies; Leader in Social Causes 
was 92, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at D20 [hereinafter Obituary]; see also 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, Garrison, Lloyd K. (Lloyd Kirkham). Papers, 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/6
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loss that sometimes seemed to him to offset his other 
accomplishments.  He represented Robert Oppenheimer before 
the Atomic Energy Commission when Oppenheimer lost his 
security clearance, something Lloyd felt he was personally 
responsible for.3 
Perhaps it was his sense of having failed Oppenheimer that 
led Mr. Garrison to take on another seemingly hopeless case—the 
appeal of the FPC decision that had licensed the Storm King 
Project.  Up to that point, no FPC license for a hydroelectric plant 
had been successfully challenged on the merits, and there was 
little reason to be optimistic about a case where the central issue 
was a complaint that the Project would damage scenic beauty.  
But for Lloyd, the representation was as much personal as 
professional.  He cared deeply about the natural world and loved 
the Hudson. 
There was no such thing as environmentalism at the time, 
but there was a long history of conservation—a good deal of which 
emanated from New York and the Hudson River.  It is no 
accident that Theodore Roosevelt was a New Yorker.  It is no 
accident that J.P. Morgan, Colonel Rupert, the Rockefellers, the 
Harrimans, the Perkins, and many other wealthy families built 
their summer homes in the Hudson Highlands.4  Nor is it 
serendipity that the Adirondacks were declared “forever wild” at 
the instance of New York City families in 1892, or that in 1910, 
Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of New York and later 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, signed into law an extension 
for the Palisades Park to include the Highlands as far north as 
Newburgh.5  John Muir may have founded the conservation 
movement, but it was the wealth of New York City—and the 
interest of its patricians—that fueled it.  It should, then, be no 
surprise that Lloyd Garrison, great-grandson of the abolitionist 
 
1893-1990: Finding Aid, http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/ deliver/~law00054 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Finding Aid]; LLOYD K. GARRISON, 
REMINISCENCES OF LLOYD KIRKHAM GARRISON: ORAL HISTORY (1969) [hereinafter 
ORAL HISTORY I]; LLOYD K. GARRISON, REMINISCENCES OF LLOYD KIRKHAM 
GARRISON: ORAL HISTORY (1982) [hereinafter ORAL HISTORY II]. 
 3. See Obituary, supra note 2; see also Finding Aid, supra note 2; ORAL 
HISTORY I, supra note 2; ORAL HISTORY II, supra note 2. 
 4. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 111-137. 
 5. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 138-165. 
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William Lloyd Garrison, himself a New Yorker by heritage, cared 
about the land and believed in conservation. So when he was 
asked to take an appeal to the Second Circuit, there was no way 
he was going to say no. 
The appeal was from a decision of the Federal Power 
Commission, since renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.6  The FPC had just granted a license for what Con 
Edison had named the “Cornwall Project”—a reference to the 
town in which plant was to be built.  It was to be the largest 
pumped storage hydroelectric project in the world, capable of 
providing 20% of New York City’s peak energy load.  The 
powerhouse was to be carved into the north flank of Storm King 
Mountain, extending 800 feet along the shore and rising 110 feet 
above the Hudson, with eight six-story transformers and a huge 
crane on top of it.  The powerhouse would contain a series of so-
called “reversible” pump-turbines that would be used at night to 
pump water from the Hudson into a reservoir 1,000 feet above the 
River, where it would be stored until daytime electric demand 
began to grow.  Then the water would be released to course down 
through a huge tunnel and drive the reversed pumps—now 
turbines—generating power at the time it was needed most.  It 
would take three kilowatts of power to pump the water up to the 
reservoir for each two kilowatts that came from the Project.  But 
the three kilowatts would come from efficient plants that were 
not being fully utilized at night, while the two kilowatts would be 
available at peak hours when Con Edison’s other capacity was 
limited.  In effect, the plan was to create a huge storage battery 
at Storm King Mountain.7 
The problem was that the plant was to be located at one of 
the most dramatic and beautiful spots on the Hudson or any 
other eastern river.  The Hudson Highlands were, as Life 
Magazine described them in 1964, “one of the grandest passages 
of River scenery in the world.”8  The great German traveler 
 
 6. See generally Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., Fed. Power Comm’n 
Opinion No. 452, Project No. 2338, 57 P.U.R.3d 279 (F.P.C.) (1965) [hereinafter 
FPC Opinion No. 452]. 
 7. See FPC Opinion No. 452, supra note 6; Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference 
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Scenic 
Hudson I]. 
 8. Editorial: Must God’s Junkyard Grow?, LIFE MAG., July 31, 1964, at 4. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/6
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Baedeker had found the landscape of the Highlands to be 
“grander and more inspiring than the Rhine’s,”9 while the New 
York Times, editorializing against the Project, described the area 
as “one of the most stunning regions in the Eastern United 
States.”10  And the northern portal to the Gorge, with Storm King 
on the west and Breakneck Ridge on the east, provided the most 
magnificent of all views. 
It was into this scene that the powerhouse would be carved.  
An artist’s rendering in Con Edison’s 1962 Annual Report sent to 
its shareholders in April 1963 showed the side of the Mountain 
cut away, leaving a gash the size of three football fields laid end-
on-end with a high cliff behind.11  It was this illustration, in 
particular, that roused lovers of the Highlands to action.  There 
was little precedent for citizen opposition in these circumstances, 
but a small group of individuals organized themselves as the 
 
 9. Editorial: Defacing the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1963, at 22.  See also 
Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d at 613. 
 10. Editorial, supra note 9.  The Times Editorial read, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
If any utility proposed to construct a plant in the middle of Central 
Park, the absurdity of such a defacement of precious natural (or 
nearly natural) surroundings would be immediately apparent.  It is 
almost as bad to plunk down a couple of power installations right in 
the heart one of the most stunning natural regions in the Eastern 
United States: Storm King Mountain (north of Bear Mountain and 
West Point) and Breakneck Ridge on the opposite (eastern) side of 
the Hudson. 
All of us who have driven down from New England and northern 
New York have looked with awe at these breath-taking mountains.  
All of us who have hiked and played in the Palisades Interstate Park 
know what a beautiful backyard exits 50 miles north of New York.  
Is it too close to home to appreciate?  “This is a very good land to fall 
with and a pleasant land to see,” said one of Henry Hudson’s officers, 
going up the river under these high blue hills.  The great traveler 
Baedeker found the Hudson’s scenery “grander and more inspiring” 
than the Rhine’s. 
The proposed power plants of Consolidated Edison at Storm King 
and of Central Hudson Gas and Electric at Breakneck Ridge would 
desecrate great areas that are part of the natural and historic 
heritage of our country, are still largely unspoiled and should remain 
that way. 
 11. The rendering is reproduced in DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 203. 
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Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference and set out to make a 
difference.12 
Their first approach was to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, 
whose response was that if they did not like the Project, they 
should buy the Mountain.13  Short of the required funds and with 
Con Edison uninterested in selling, Scenic Hudson was relegated 
to finding some other way of opposing the plant.  The organizers 
soon learned that the Project required a license from the FPC, 
and after several weeks of searching, they hired a lawyer—Dale 
Doty, a former FPC Commissioner—to represent them.  The 
hearings were scheduled to come on quickly, but Dale was able to 
secure a delay of several months, giving him an opportunity to 
prepare a rudimentary case.14 
There were four days of hearings in 1964.  Most of Scenic 
Hudson’s testimony was directed toward the natural beauty and 
historic importance of Storm King and the Highlands.  But Dale 
Doty also presented a witness who described alternatives in very 
general terms.  Con Edison’s cross-examination of the Scenic 
Hudson witnesses was brutal.  The FPC staff, for its part, backed 
the Project with no pretense of objectivity or neutrality.  When 
the hearings were closed, the future looked grim.15 
But Scenic Hudson chose to fight on and made a key decision 
in this regard.  It hired a public relations firm—Selvage & Lee—
to get the story out, and the new consultants immediately started 
to do exactly that.  Among other things, the firm organized a 
flotilla of yachts and other boats to sail up the Hudson to Storm 
King and plant signs in response to Con Edison’s then motto—
”Dig We Must for a Growing New York.”  “Dig You Must Not,” the 
 
 12. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 91-96; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 207-08; BOYLE, 
supra note 1, at 155-56. 
 13. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 95. 
 14. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 96-98; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 209-10; BOYLE, 
supra note 1, at 157. 
 15. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 98-106; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 210-11; 
BOYLE, supra note 1, at 157-58.  All testimony before the FPC in the 1964 and 
all subsequent hearings can be found in the transcripts of the proceedings in 
Case No. 2338, copies of which are available in the Scenic Hudson archives at 
Marist College.  See Marist Environmental History Project, The Scenic Hudson 
Decision Hearings Transcripts Collection, MARIST COLLEGE, 
http://library.marist.edu/archives/shdht/ shdht.xml (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/6
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signs read, and the national media picked the story up.16  
Stephen Currier, a philanthropist whose lawyer happened to be 
Lloyd Garrison, took note of the story and decided he wanted to 
help.  He was willing to give money if it could be used.17 
As to that, there was no doubt—Scenic Hudson intended to 
press on with the case.  Alexander Lurkis, the recently-retired 
Chief Engineer for the City’s Department of Water Supply, Gas 
and Electricity, had written a Letter to The Editor of the Times, 
identifying what he said was a superior alternative—a series of 
jet engine gas turbine generators that were new to the market.  
The PR firm reached out and hired him to develop the alternative 
in detail.  Scenic Hudson then persuaded a New York State 
Senator to call legislative hearings on the Project in November of 
1964.  Lurkis made a detailed presentation of the alternative, 
including cost comparisons showing his plan to be much less 
costly than Cornwall.18 
Also appearing was Bob Boyle, the Outdoors writer for Sports 
Illustrated and a Hudson River worshipper writ-big.  Boyle had 
discovered a report from ten years earlier that suggested the 
center of the spawning grounds for the recreationally- and 
commercially-important Hudson River striped bass was at Storm 
King Mountain.  Since the Project would ingest vast amounts of 
water—some 8,000,000 gallons a minute—in which the eggs and 
fish larvae would be floating helplessly, the danger to the striped 
bass population was obvious.  What made the disclosure all the 
more dramatic is that the study had been supervised by Con 
Edison’s fisheries expert, who had testified in the FPC hearings 
that the Plant posed no threat to aquatic or marine life.19 
Scenic Hudson promptly arranged to have the Lurkis and 
Boyle testimony submitted to the FPC, with a request that the 
hearings be reopened to consider the new evidence.20  The FPC 
rejected the submissions as untimely.  Then, in February 1965, 
 
 16. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 212-13; see TALBOT, supra note 1, at 108-10; 
BOYLE, supra note 1, at 156. 
 17. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 168; TALBOT, supra note 1, at 114-15. 
 18. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 111-12; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 213; BOYLE, 
supra note 1, at 162. 
 19. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 158-61, 165; TALBOT, supra note 1, at 112-14; 
DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 213. 
 20. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 114; see BOYLE, supra note 1, at 164-65. 
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the State Legislative Committee issued its report in which it 
found the Lurkis testimony compelling and the Boyle discovery 
disturbing.  It urged the FPC to reopen the case, finding that the 
scenic beauty of the area was unexcelled and concluding, with 
respect to the Project, that “the committee must go on record as 
being opposed to its approval.”21 
All this went unheeded.  On March 9, 1965, the FPC granted 
the license application, finding, among other things, that the 
scenic beauty of Storm King Mountain would not be diminished 
by the plant but would actually be improved by the removal of a 
number of derelict structures.  It also found that there was no 
feasible alternative and no danger to the fisheries.22 
Two and a half weeks later, at the behest of Stephen Currier, 
who agreed to finance the appeal, the case came to Mr. Garrison.  
Actually, it did not come only to Mr. Garrison.  Before Lloyd said 
“yes,” he had recruited his partner to work with him.  This was 
Judge Simon Rifkind, one of the twentieth century’s great trial 
and appellate attorneys, who, Lloyd believed, would argue the 
case before the Second Circuit.  As it turned out, that did not 
happen, and Lloyd argued the case himself.  But Judge Rifkind 
made his own invaluable contributions.23 
The first of these, which he and Mr. Garrison hit on jointly, 
was to rename the Project.  No longer would it be the Cornwall 
Project, which had no sex-appeal.  In our briefs and 
announcements, this was, from then on, the Storm King Project. 
There is, for me, a certain irony in how central this minor 
adjustment became as the case progressed.  Storm King was all 
very well, but this was a belated title.  The original Dutch settlers 
had called the mountain Boterberg, which, translated into 
English, became Butter Hill.  Can anyone doubt that a battle over 
Butter Hill would have been considerably less impassioned than a 
battle over Storm King?  Happily, Nathaniel Willis, a romantic 
 
 21. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 213-14 n.15 (citing N.Y. STATE LEGIS., 
PRELIMINARY REP. OF THE JOINT LEGIS. COMM. ON NATURAL RES. ON THE HUDSON 
RIVER VALLEY AND THE CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. STORM KING MOUNTAIN 
PROJECT 1-2 (1965)).  See TALBOT, supra note 1, at 112 (suggesting that the 
Report was drafted by one of Scenic Hudson’s PR consultants). 
 22. See generally FPC Opinion No. 452, supra note 6. 
 23. From this point on, except as otherwise indicated, the narrative of events 
is based on the author’s personal experience and knowledge. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/6
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writer who lived in the Highlands, felt Butter Hill was an 
indignity for such a grand geological feature.  Remembering the 
clouds and lightning that raged around the Mountain in the 
summer, he renamed it Storm King.24  So, if you will, modern 
environmental law may be indebted to Mr. Willis for its start. 
The further wisdom that Judge Rifkind brought to the case 
was his counsel that it could not be won on the grounds that the 
FPC had misjudged the impacts on scenic beauty, because of 
what is known as the “substantial evidence” test.  This traditional 
test, incorporated into section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, 
provided that the Commission’s findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, were conclusive.25  Whatever else might be 
said about the hearing record, there had been testimony on both 
sides regarding the impacts of the Project on the landscape, and 
that, the Judge felt, put the issue of scenic beauty beyond reach.  
Instead, both he and Mr. Garrison agreed that we needed to 
emphasize the gaps in the FPC record, including the limited 
discussion of alternatives in light of the later Lurkis testimony 
and the Commission’s indifference to fisheries impacts.  The 
Power Act expressly provided that a party to the FPC’s 
proceedings could apply to the Circuit Court for leave to adduce 
additional evidence,26 and this fit nicely with the idea that the 
focus should be on what the Commission had largely ignored 
rather than directly confronting the core issue of the damaging 
impact of the Project on the natural beauty of the Hudson 
Highlands.  At the same time, Judge Rifkind urged that scenic 
beauty be used to set the context of the case.  Because the area 
was so magnificent, we would argue—and did—that the FPC 
 
 24. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 9-10.  The following quote from Willis’s Outdoors 
at Idlewild is included in DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 63-64. 
The tallest mountain, with its feet in the Hudson at the Highland 
Gap, is officially called the Storm King—being looked to, by the 
whole country around, as the most sure foreteller of a storm.  When 
the white cloud-beard descends upon his breast in the morning (as if 
with a nod forward of his majestic head), there is sure to be a rain-
storm before night.  Standing aloft among the other mountains of the 
chain, this sign is peculiar to him.  He seems the monarch, and this 
seems his stately ordering of a change in the weather.  Should not 
STORM-KING, then, be his proper title? 
 25. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2012). 
 26. Id. 
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should have bent over backwards to find an alternative.  Instead, 
it sat on its hands. 
After all the strategizing, Lloyd Garrison went to work, and 
the papers he produced were exquisite.  He had a poetic sense of 
the English language and used it to extraordinary effect in our 
briefs.  Several of us—in time narrowed to myself—would prepare 
drafts of different sections of the papers.  Lloyd would then call 
his secretary into his office and pacing back and forth would 
dictate late into the night translating what he had been given 
into prose that stirred the soul and made the desired outcome 
seem obligatory.  He had that knack, and it is not surprising that 
many of the words Judge Hays used in the 1965 Scenic Hudson 
opinion came directly from our briefs.  My contribution was the 
research, and I do not make light of that.  But it was Lloyd 
Garrison who put it to good use and created the road map that led 
the Second Circuit to the decision it reached. 
Lloyd was also acutely aware of the times in which we were 
proceeding.  He did not have much confidence the case could be 
won, but to the extent there was hope, it was because, as Bob 
Dylan sang, “the times, they were a-changin’.”  This was 1965, 
three years after Rachel Carson had published Silent Spring, 
which in many ways changed Americans’ way of thinking about 
the environment.  The concern over DDT had already resulted in 
one unsuccessful lawsuit.27  There were plans to dam the 
Colorado in the Grand Canyon, and Dave Brower and the Sierra 
Club were already on that case.28  Increasing concern was being 
expressed about the new interstate highways being slashed 
through cherished landscapes, and more and more Americans 
found themselves impacted by the vast web of new transmission 
wires being woven across the country to meet the soaring demand 
for electricity.  Perhaps most important of all, President Lyndon 
B. Johnson had begun to emphasize the “quality of life” with his 
 
 27. See generally Murphy v. Benson, 151 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). 
 28. The concern over the Grand Canyon dams culminated in a series of full-
page ads placed by the Sierra Club and David Brower in the New York Times 
and the Washington Post in July 1966.  These strongly opposed the dams.  One 
of them was headlined: “Should we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can 
get nearer the ceiling?” Sierra Club, Should We Also Flood the Sistine Chapel So 
Tourists Can Get Nearer the Ceiling? (1966), available at 
http://www.infomarketingblog.com/space_ads/Sistine_Chapel.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/6
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Great Society programs, and he related this specifically to 
landscape in his 1965 State of the Union address, saying: 
For over three centuries, the beauty of America has sustained our 
spirit and enlarged our vision.  We must act now to protect this 
heritage.  In a fruitful new partnership with the States and the 
cities the next decade should be a conservation milestone.  We 
must make a massive effort to save the countryside and 
establish—as a green legacy for tomorrow—more large and small 
parks, more seashores and open spaces than have been created 
during any other period in our national history.29 
The times, in short, were ripe for a case like Storm King to be 
heard in federal court. 
It is worth noting that President Johnson made no mention 
of the environment.  The word he used was conservation, and in 
that sense, the new values being identified had their roots in the 
past.  We too thought in terms of conservation.  Yet, as it turned 
out, it was a conservation looking forward that soon enough 
would morph into the broader environmental litigation 
movement.  But neither Lloyd nor I nor any of the others who 
helped write the briefs had any idea that the case would have the 
broad implications that it did.  We were simply trying to save 
Storm King. 
The case was argued to the Second Circuit in late October 
1965.  Mr. Garrison was eloquent and persuasive.  Con Edison’s 
counsel ranted, to little effect.  And the panel found it incredible 
when the attorney for the FPC argued that the Project would 
improve the scenery of the Highlands. 
Two weeks later, the City went dark.  The Great 1965 
Blackout rolled out of Canada and within ten minutes, Con 
Edison’s electric system closed down for thirteen hours.  The next 
day, the company had ads in every major paper stating that if the 
Cornwall Project had been on line—and but for the opposition it 
would be under construction—the City would have been saved.  
And only Cornwall could have made the difference because of its 
 
 29. The full address can be found at the website of The American Presidency 
Project.  Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the 
Union (Jan. 4, 1965), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26907 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
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special hydro characteristics.  The Lurkis alternative we were 
asking the court to order the FPC to consider would have done no 
good.  Needless to say, we did not regard the Blackout as good 
news. 
The story, however, is that the three judges were in the midst 
of reviewing a first draft of their opinion at the time the Blackout 
hit and when the lights went out, they simply lit candles and 
continued their work.30  This is probably apocryphal, but seven 
weeks later, on December 29, 1965, the court came down with its 
landmark Scenic Hudson decision.  I will return to discuss the 
opinion in a few minutes, noting only at this point that enough 
commentators have suggested that modern environmental law 
was born out of the decision to make me believe it might be 
true.31 
What I want to do first is to recount the rest of the story, 
because the case did not end, and Storm King was not saved, for 
another fifteen years.  Of these, the first five were spent before 
the FPC in two series of remanded hearings involving, among 
other issues, impacts on natural beauty, geology, alternatives, 
fisheries impacts, underground transmission, costs and the 
potential of damaging the City’s Catskill Aqueduct.  Among the 
celebrities to give testimony on scenic beauty were Dave Brower, 
Sierra Club Executive Director, Vincent Scully, distinguished 
professor of art history at Yale, Brooks Atkinson, the New York 
Times drama critic, and Richard Pough, founder of The Nature 
Conservancy.  Also putting in an appearance was Edward Teller, 
father of the H Bomb, who testified in support of the commercial 
 
 30. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 218. 
 31. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law and the General Welfare, 
19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675 (2002) (Fourth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on 
Environmental Law); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental ‘Rule of 
Law’ Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 583 (2002) (Sixth Annual Lloyd K. 
Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law); John E. Bonine, Private Public 
Interest Environmental Law: History, Hard Work and Hope, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 465, 466 (2009) (15th Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental 
Law); E-law: What Started It All?, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).  See also, 
HOUCK, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
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use of nuclear power, only to be embarrassed on cross 
examination by knowing practically nothing about it.32 
The concern over the Aqueduct arose when Con Edison 
redesigned the powerhouse to relocate it largely underground.  
This, however, required excavation and blasting within 140 feet 
of the Aqueduct, which supplies 40% of the City’s water—
something the City strenuously opposed.  This led to a further set 
of hearings that also considered the possible relocation of the 
plant into the Palisades Interstate Park.  When the testimony 
finally came to an end in 1969—almost three years after it had 
begun—several rounds of briefing followed before a final appeal 
to the full Commission, all of which came to naught. 
In 1970, the FPC relicensed the Project, finding again that it 
would do no damage to the natural beauty of Storm King 
Mountain, brushing aside the risks to the Catskill Aqueduct and 
finding, on the basis of an interagency report that had never been 
placed in the record or subject to cross examination, that the 
impacts on the Hudson River fish populations, including striped 
bass, would be negligible.33 
 
 32. The remanded hearings began in the fall of 1966, and were continued 
originally to May 1967.  In 1968, the hearings were reopened to consider the 
potential dangers to the City’s Catskill Aqueduct and continued into 1969.  The 
testimony in the hearings can be found in the transcripts for FPC Project 2338, 
available in the Scenic Hudson Archives of the Marist College Library.  It is 
worth quoting Professor Scully’s testimony.  In giving the basis for his 
conclusion that the redesigned powerhouse would damage the scenic features of 
Storm King Mountain, he responded: 
. . . Storm King is the central issue, and it is a mountain that should 
be left alone.  It rises like a brown bear out of the river, a dome of 
living granite, swelling with animal power.  It is not picturesque in 
the softer sense of the word, but awesome, a primitive embodiment 
of the energies of the earth.  It makes the character of wild nature 
physically visible in monumental form.  As such it strongly reminds 
me of some of the natural formations which mark sacred sites in 
Greece and signal the presence of the Gods; it preserves and 
embodies the most savage and untrammeled characteristics of the 
wild at the very threshold of New York.  It can still make the city 
dweller emotionally aware of what he most needs to know: that 
nature still exists, with its own laws, rhythms, and powers, separate 
from human desires. 
DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 220. 
 33. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., Fed. Power Comm’n, Opinion No. 584, 
Project No. 2338, 85 P.U.R.3d 129 (F.P.C.) (1970) [hereinafter FPC Opinion No. 
584]. 
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Scenic Hudson again appealed, joined this time by the Sierra 
Club and other national conservation organizations represented 
by David Sive, and also joined by the City and the Palisades 
Interstate Park Commission.  The difference this time around 
was that there were 19,000 pages of testimony and 675 exhibits 
to which the FPC could point as “substantial evidence” to support 
its conclusions.  Faced with the expansive record, which we 
understood would carry great weight, our briefs laid their 
principal emphasis on the Commission’s failure to honor the 
earlier Scenic Hudson mandate in substance and spirit, rather 
than simply by mouthing the words.  In effect, we asked the court 
not to apply the “substantial evidence” test in the area of scenic 
and historic values and to recognize that only the judiciary could 
offset the inherent bias of the FPC and its lack of expertise in 
matters of culture and aesthetics. 
Our briefs were bulky and lacked the easy logic that had 
been so successful in 1965.  Mr. Garrison labored mightily, as did 
I, but the ringing prose of our earlier briefs often eluded us. 
In the end, the majority of the three judges rejected our 
arguments and upheld the Commission’s re-licensing of the 
Storm King Project.  In doing so, the court summarized at some 
length the evidence that supported the FPC findings and then 
applied the “substantial evidence” test.  There being testimony on 
both sides of every issue, the Commission’s findings were 
conclusive, and that was that.34 
Judge Oakes dissented in an opinion which sharply 
illuminated the divide between traditional interpretations of 
administrative law, which the majority of the panel had adhered 
to, and the potential of a new kind of judicial review in matters 
involving the environment, which, if it had been accepted, could 
have changed the fundamental relationship between the agencies 
and the courts in such matters.  I will return to this subject in a 
few minutes, but I think it is worth quoting here the portion of 
the Oakes dissent where he made his point: 
The final matters which, to my mind, tip the scales for a reversal 
rather than simply a reversal and remand are two.  The first 
 
 34. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463, 
463 (2d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Scenic Hudson II]. 
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concerns what may broadly be called aesthetics, impairment by 
the project of the mountain’s scenic grandeur.  The commission’s 
Findings 148 refers to the mountain “swallow[ing]” the “scar of 
the highway, the intrusive railroad structure and fills and 
tolerat[ing] both the barges and scows which pass by it and the 
thoughtless humans [sic] who visit it without seeing it. . . .”  The 
findings go on to say that just as the mountain swallows present 
day intrusions, “it will swallow the structures which will serve 
the needs of people for electric power.”  This argument borders on 
the outrageous; it can be used to justify every intrusion on nature 
from strip mining to ocean oil spills . . . .  Two scenic wrongs do 
not necessarily make a right.  On the basis of the commission’s 
thesis, wherever you have one billboard you can put two, 
wherever you have one overhead transmission line you can put 
another, you can add blight to blight to blight.  That a 
responsible federal agency should advance that proposition in the 
form of a finding and in the teeth of the NEPA seems to me 
shocking.  The commission’s finding overlooks the fact that we 
are considering here a power station which above ground will 
consist of a concrete tailrace with abutments 32 feet high and 685 
feet long, cutting back existing shore line from 195 to 260 feet, 
exclusive of any access road.  This location, as the commission 
concedes, is on a small riverbottom foothill which “is visually a 
part of Storm King Mountain.” The mountain may “swallow” the 
project, but the concrete tailrace and abutments, as long as a 
good-sized football stadium—over an eighth of a mile—and three 
stories high, will surely be stuck in its craw.35 
It is worth noting that if Judge Oakes had prevailed, he 
would have reversed the FPC decision without any remand.  The 
court would have had the last word.  The court would have 
identified the values that deserved to be protected, and that 
would have been the end of it. 
At this point, many felt the game was over, but it was not.  
Early in 1972, before Con Edison could start construction, 
Congress passed the Clean Water Act Amendments, which, in 
section 401, required that before any federal license could be 
issued that affected the waters of the United States, the state in 
 
 35. Id. at 491 (Oakes, J. dissenting) (internal footnotes omitted).  A petition 
for rehearing en banc was denied by an equally-divided Second Circuit, with 
Justice Timbers adding his own dissent. 
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which the project was located had to certify that its operation 
would comply with state water quality standards.36  The Storm 
King Project fell within the definition and New York State 
ordered hearings.  When DEC granted the certification, Scenic 
Hudson (which I now represented on my own) appealed.  We won 
in the Supreme Court, before a Judge with the wonderful name of 
DeForest C. Pitt,37 but the decision was reversed by the Appellate 
Division, and the Court of Appeals upheld the reversal.38  In the 
intermediate eighteen months, however, Con Edison had held off 
beginning construction due to the pending litigation. 
In early 1974, the company announced that it intended to 
start and began to assemble a construction team on site.  
However, it was a reluctant start, because by then, Con Edison 
was in serious financial distress.  The company felt forced to 
initiate construction because the Federal Power Act required that 
work begin within four years of the date the license was issued or 
the license would lapse. 
 Before work could start, Scenic Hudson brought another 
lawsuit, invoking section 404 of the Clean Water Act 
Amendments, which required a permit for any landfill in 
navigable waters.39  The Storm King project included fifty-seven 
acres of landfill—the material blasted from the Mountain was to 
be dumped along the waterfront immediately to the north and 
used for a local park.  Con Edison, initially supported by the 
government, argued that the Federal Power Act overrode all 
other legislation.  But after thinking about it a while, the 
government changed its mind and supported our position that 
section 404 applied and a permit was needed.  The U.S. District 
Court agreed and enjoined the landfill, but not the entire 
project.40  The Second Circuit affirmed.41 
 
 36. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), (a)(6) (2012). 
 37. See generally deRham v. Diamond, 69 Misc. 2d 1 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 
1972). 
 38. See generally deRham v. Diamond, 39 A.D.2d 302 (3d Dep’t 1972), aff’d 32 
N.Y.2d 34 (1973). 
 39. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 40. See generally Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 41. See generally Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 127 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
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Meanwhile, licensing hearings for the nuclear plants at 
Indian Point had revealed that the fisheries study on which the 
FPC had based its 1970 licensing decision—the interagency 
report that was not in the record and had never been subject to 
cross examination—was fundamentally flawed.  It had failed to 
take account of the tidal nature of the Hudson and, as a result, 
had understated the potential impact of Storm King on the 
striped bass population.  Rather than 4% of the first year striped 
bass being sucked into the plant, the corrected number was 
40%—a harrowing threat to the fisheries.42 
Armed with this information, Angus Macbeth, one of the 
original NRDC attorneys who represented the Hudson River 
Fisherman’s Association, petitioned the FPC to revisit the 
fisheries impacts of the plant on a novel theory.  In granting the 
license, the Commission had included a condition requiring Con 
Edison to continue to study the potential fisheries impacts and if 
necessary to modify the operations of the plant to mitigate the 
damage.43  Angus asked the Commission to address the new 
evidence on impacts under this license condition and to do so 
immediately in view of the extraordinary magnitude of the 
change in the predicted damage.  It was a brilliant concept that 
invoked the limited protections the FPC had itself included in the 
license. 
At the same time, Scenic Hudson petitioned the FPC to re-
open the entire proceedings based not only on the discrepancies in 
the fisheries report, but also because the economics of the Project 
had changed compared to the gas turbine alternative, as revealed 
in a detailed study by the City’s Department of Environmental 
Protection.  When the FPC denied both petitions, Angus and I 
appealed for a third time to the Second Circuit. 
The prospects of success were not great.  There were 
powerful Supreme Court precedents to the effect that once a 
 
 42. The study was conducted by a Policy Committee funded by Con Edison 
that included representatives of the company, the Fish & Wildlife Service and 
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.  The Policy 
Committee's report, which was issued after the hearings closed, but before the 
FPC had issued its 1970 licensing opinion, was titled Hudson River Fisheries 
Investigation 1965-68.  See Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 498 F.2d 827, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 43. FPC Opinion No. 584, supra note 32, at Articles 15, 16, 36. 
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license survives judicial review, the courts cannot revisit it again, 
even though circumstances may have changed dramatically; 
otherwise, the administrative process would never come to an 
end.  At the same time, the potential impacts on the striped bass 
were frightening, and the new calculations of those impacts had 
been made by government scientists and biologists.  At the 
argument, the panel was clearly sympathetic to our position, and 
in the end, in a truly remarkable decision (which is well worth 
reading), the court avoided the Supreme Court precedents by 
ordering the FPC to promptly hold hearings on the discredited 
study under the license condition that the Commission itself had 
approved.44  The court denied the Scenic Hudson petition to 
reopen the hearings in their entirety, but said that if, by the end 
of year, the hearings had shown that the damage to the striped 
bass could be substantial, a full reopening might be ordered.45 
By this time—early May 1974—construction had begun at 
Storm King, but on a limited scale.  The first charges of dynamite 
had been laid and the first rock blasted to create the main water 
tunnel, but Con Edison was clearly in no hurry.  In an effort to 
stop the work altogether, I asked the Second Circuit to issue an 
injunction against construction in light of its decision, which 
might require the reopening of the entire case and 
reconsideration of the entire project.  Con Edison responded by 
saying it would forfeit its license if it could not proceed.  The 
Court of Appeals denied my request, but in doing so offered its 
opinion that construction had clearly started within the meaning 
of the Federal Power Act and if the company were to stop building 
at this point, there would be no license forfeiture.46  A week later, 
Con Edison called a halt to the work.  It was never to start up 
again. 
 There is much more to the story, but because my time is 
limited, I will abbreviate the later chapters.  The fisheries 
hearings that the Second Circuit ordered were both exciting and 
revealing.  Faced with the court’s deadline, the FPC did 
everything it could—fair and unfair—in an effort to expedite 
them.  But the evidence was insistent, confirming in short order 
 
 44. See generally Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n, 498 F.2d 827. 
 45. Id. at 835. 
 46. Id. (On Petitions for Rehearing). 
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the fundamental flaw in the 1970 fisheries report and then 
exposing the potential for severe damage to the striped bass, with 
little to rebut that conclusion.  As the year-end approached with a 
record developing in the wrong way, Con Edison and the FPC 
petitioned the Second Circuit for more time to carry out 
additional studies to try to disprove the adverse impacts.  The 
Court of Appeals granted the request for additional time and 
rejected a simultaneous petition by Scenic Hudson to reopen the 
case in its entirety.  But in doing so, it enjoined further work on 
the Project.  Shortly after that, the Department of the Interior 
and the FPC’s own staff came to the conclusion that the plant 
should not be built.  The handwriting was on the wall. 
Still, it took another five years before Con Edison 
surrendered its license and gave the property it had acquired for 
the Project to the Palisades Park Commission.  There were no 
more court decisions.  The coup de grace came by way of a 
complex settlement agreement negotiated over two years and 
involving not only the Storm King Project but also seven other 
power plants that used the Hudson for cooling water, three of 
which had been ordered by EPA to install closed-cycle cooling to 
protect the fisheries.  Russell Train, the first chair of the Council 
on Environment Quality and EPA Administrator from 1973 to 
1977, served as an independent mediator and worked a miracle in 
bringing the twelve parties to the table and helping them forge a 
final agreement, which was signed in December 1980.47 
In addition to giving up the Storm King Project, Con Edison 
and its fellow utilities agreed to modify the operations of their 
other power plants to sharply reduce the intake of water during 
the critical spawning and early growth seasons; they contributed 
$12 million to establish a Hudson River research foundation; and 
most important of all—at least to the lawyers—they agreed to 
pay $500,000 of our legal fees.  In return for these and other 
concessions, the utilities were relieved of their obligations to build 
cooling towers at Indian Point and two other large power plants.  
The settlement was hailed by the New York Times as a “Peace 
 
 47. For an excellent description of the settlement and settlement negotiation, 
see ALLAN R. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MEDIATION 1-24 (1983).  For materials bearing on the settlement, including the 
actual settlement agreement, see SETTLEMENT MATERIALS, supra note 1. 
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Treaty for the Hudson.”48  Charles Luce, Chairman of Con 
Edison, was more pointed.  “We lost the fight,” he 
acknowledged.49  Bob Boyle, President of the Hudson River 
Fisherman’s Association, put in another way: “We raked in most 
of the chips and they got cab fare home.”50  Thus, the saga of 
Storm King came to an end. 
So, the story of persistence aside, what did it all mean?  How 
does the case bear on environmental law today?  Is there a legacy 
or has the promise of the 1965 decision been cut short?  These are 
questions that I would like to address in my remaining time. 
I begin with standing.  This is one of the most frequently 
referenced bases on which the Scenic Hudson decision is 
identified as having initiated modern environmental law.  That 
standing was an issue at all was almost accidental.  The Federal 
Power Act provided that any person aggrieved by an FPC decision 
could seek review in the Court of Appeals, and as we drafted our 
initial papers, it never occurred to us that there was any question 
of Scenic Hudson’s right to appeal.  It was the FPC, out of the 
blue, that challenged standing.  It was fortunate for us that the 
Federal Power Act required that any license that FPC issued be 
in accordance with a comprehensive plan for the waterway, 
including, in specific language added only in 1935, “recreational 
use.”51  We were also fortunate that in an earlier case, the FPC, 
in a decision written by Dale Doty, had itself recognized the 
 
 48. Editorial: A Peace Treaty for the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 20, 1980), at 
24. 
 49. HOUCK, supra note 1, at 19. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2012).  It is interesting to note that in 1986, the 
following specific language was added to the Act in section 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 
797(e): 
 In deciding whether to issue any license under [16 U.S.C. §§ 792-825] for 
any project, the Commission, in addition to the power and development 
purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal consideration to 
the purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of 
damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including related 
spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational 
opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of environmental 
quality. 
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maintenance of natural beauty as a component of recreational use 
and had denied a license on that basis.52 
We argued, and the court accepted, that because the Federal 
Power Act recognized and forwarded recreational uses, including 
the maintenance of scenic beauty, as a factor, the FPC was 
required to take into account, the judicial review provisions of the 
Act had to be read to empower those specially interested in 
protecting recreation and scenic beauty to seek review under 
those provisions.  If there had been no reference to “recreational 
uses” in the statute, our contentions regarding standing might 
have been for naught. 
What made the Second Circuit holding the more remarkable, 
however, and what, as much as anything else, laid the basis for 
environmental litigation going forward under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, was the court’s holding that “interest” constituted 
an appropriate basis for standing, and that under a statute such 
as the Federal Power Act, interest in the environment, without a 
pecuniary stake, was sufficient to confer standing.  As the court 
put it: 
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will 
adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, 
conservational, and recreational aspects of power development, 
those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special 
interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of 
“aggrieved” parties under § 313(b).  We hold that the Federal 
Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special 
interests.53 
In retrospect, this may have been the most thrilling and 
potentially expansive of all the court’s holdings.  This was so in 
major part because it explicitly said that petitioners like Scenic 
Hudson did not have to suffer economic damage to be able to sue.  
But beyond this, the decision effectively held that the case and 
controversy requirement of Article III could be met as a result of 
 
 52. Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 216 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 
1954). 
 53. Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing Wash. Dep’t of 
Game v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 n.11 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. 
denied, 347 U.S 936 (1954)) (emphasis added). 
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injury to a special interest in the environment, rather than the 
more traditional concept of “injury in fact” or “to self.”  If future 
decisions had continued down this road, ease of access to the 
courts for environmental claimants would have been much 
greater than it is today. 
Unhappily, this was not the case.  Six years later, in Sierra 
Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court held that interest alone was 
not enough—there had to be injury in fact.54  The decision, 
however, upheld the central Scenic Hudson holding that economic 
injury was not a prerequisite to standing and made it relatively 
easy for both organizational and individual petitioners to meet 
the threshold requirements in most environmental law cases.55  
The story after that is a matter of highs, followed by lows, 
followed, in Laidlaw and Massachusetts v. EPA, by a return to 
somewhat more liberal standing requirements.56  But the switch 
of a single vote on the Supreme Court would make entry to the 
courts ever more difficult for environmental interests.  It is hard 
to comprehend how, after the promise of Scenic Hudson, the 
Supreme Court and, until recently, the New York State Court of 
Appeals,57 have moved quite so far in the opposite direction.  In 
 
 54. 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). 
 55. Id. at 735-38. 
 56. See generally Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167 (2000); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  Several earlier 
Supreme Court decisions had significantly narrowed the scope of standing in 
environmental cases.  See generally Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 
(1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  The Laidlaw and 
Massachusetts v. EPA decisions were both in the direction of liberalizing 
standing somewhat, but have certainly not returned the situation to where it 
was in the 1970s.  For valuable articles on problems and directions of standing 
in environmental litigation, see, e.g., Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of 
Justice: Standing in Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 27 (2003); David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, 
and Other Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2004); Oliver A. Houck, 
Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 
(2007); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does 
Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Future Generations to Come?, 34 
COLUM.  J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009). 
 57. The New York State Court of Appeals only recently eased the standing 
requirements in environmental lawsuits, conforming them fairly closely to those 
laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.  See generally 
Save the Pinebush, Inc. v. Common Council of City of Albany, 13 N.Y.3d 297 
(2009). 
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this regard, it is my view that the full promise of the 1965 
decision has not been fulfilled. 
A second basis for regarding the Scenic Hudson opinion as a 
landmark is the importance it attached to alternatives.  To my 
considerable consternation when I was doing research for our 
initial brief, the Federal Power Act did not refer specifically to 
alternatives, but Mr. Garrison was confident that the overall 
public interest language of the statute required their 
consideration.  Here, I think, my research actually made a 
difference.  I was able to find two cases in the D.C. Circuit that 
reversed FPC decisions for failing to evaluate proffered 
alternatives under the Federal Natural Gas Act, which was also 
administered by the FPC.58  The circumstances in both those 
cases were so akin to the FPC’s rejection of the Lurkis testimony 
that it was no stretch to assert that the same standard should be 
applied under the Federal Power Act.  All we were asking the 
court was to hold the FPC to a standard that had already been 
established in other cases—we invoked what Professor Tarlock 
has called the “rule of law.”59  Our goal was to make the court’s 
decision easier in circumstances where the “substantial evidence” 
rule usually overrode everything else. 
In this, we succeeded beyond anything we had imagined.  
The court’s strong language, which included extended references 
to the Lurkis proposal (rather than dismissing it as merely a 
conflict of experts), as well as an elaboration of the cases I had 
found as guiding precedents, raised the evaluation of alternatives 
 
 58. Mich. Consol. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 283 F.2d 204, 226 (D.C. Cir. 
1960), cert. denied, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 
364 U.S. 913 (1960); City of Pittsburgh v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 237 F.2d 741, 
751 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 59. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental ‘Rule of Law’ 
Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002) (Sixth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison 
Lecture on Environmental Law).  The observations made by Professor Tarlock in 
his presentation apply not only to the issue of alternatives, but even more so to 
our briefing, and the Second Circuit’s analysis, of why the FPC was obligated to 
consider the preservation of scenic beauty.  This derived from a reading of 
section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, which required that the Project be “best 
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway” for, 
among purposes, recreation.  16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1).  We used this language to 
inject environmental issues—the protection of scenic beauty and fisheries 
resources—into the case, arguing that all we were asking was for the court to 
enforce the section 10(a) obligation.  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
23
BUTZEL FINAL-NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:27 AM 
2014] STORM KING REVISITED 393 
 
to a new level of importance.  The court, in effect, articulated—or 
some would say created—a standard that when important 
natural resources are in issue, the search for alternatives must be 
exactly that—searching.  Out of this, in turn, came NEPA’s 
requirement that federal agencies “study, develop, and describe 
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any 
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning 
alternative uses of available resources,” and that they also 
include an analysis of alternatives in every EIS.60 
For several years after NEPA was enacted, the courts 
enforced the alternatives mandates of NEPA rigorously, 
culminating, perhaps, in Judge Mansfield’s opinion in NRDC v. 
Callaway.61  However, it has been mostly downhill since then.  
Indeed, after the initial ringing affirmations of NEPA in cases 
such as Calvert Cliffs,62 it has generally been downhill for the 
statute as a whole.  As Professor Rogers put it in an earlier 
Garrison Lecture, the Supreme Court has largely emasculated 
the effectiveness of NEPA,63 reducing it to a series of procedural 
hoops through which most federal agencies have long since 
learned to jump without it having any effect on their decisions.  
And the situation is worse in New York State under SEQRA.  
Indeed, in many cases, New York City agencies use the 
alternatives sections of environmental impact statements to 
justify the action they are proposing, rather than making any 
serious effort to identify options that might have less of a 
 
 60. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(E), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(E) 
(2012); § 102(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii).  See also Oliver Houck, Unfinished 
Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 878 (2002) (“The original Second Circuit 
opinion opened the way for citizen suit standing . . . [and] the principles of 
review of environmental impacts and alternatives that are at the heart of NEPA 
. . . .”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 61. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d 
Cir. 1975). 
 62. See generally Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic 
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 63. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Defeating Environmental Law: The Geology of 
Legal Advantage, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 687, 698 (2002) (Third Annual Lloyd 
K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law). 
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negative impact.64  Here, too, in my judgment, the promise of the 
Scenic Hudson decision has not been fulfilled. 
Lastly, I turn to what many of us felt was the most 
significant of all the court’s holdings.  This followed from Judge 
Hays’ ringing directive that the FPC’s renewed proceedings “must 
include as a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and 
of national historic shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent 
society, the cost of a project is only one of several factors to be 
considered.”65 
For me—and I think for Mr. Garrison as well—this seemed to 
signal that the courts—or at least the judges of the Second 
Circuit—were prepared to inject into the legal process, as a 
fundamental consideration, the same concern for the environment 
that President Johnson had spoken about earlier in 1965.  After 
all, Judge Hays did not say that the FPC simply had to take the 
preservation of scenic beauty into account—he directed that the 
Commission do so as a basic concern.  In that moment, and for 
that moment, it appeared that the judiciary, recognizing the 
inherent biases of administrative agencies and knowing how they 
had often been taken over by the industries they were asked to 
regulate, was prepared to make its own judgments regarding 
priorities when environmental damage was threatened.  If that 
had happened, a new environmental common law might have 
followed, placing in the courts a broader role when environmental 
conflicts were involved—a balancing function that did not 
automatically defer to agencies on the basis of their supposed 
expertise but closely scrutinized their decisions and, in the end, 
applied the courts’ own series of developing environmental 
precedents to future decisions. 
Unfortunately, this was not to be.  The high water mark of 
what in my view turned out to be an aborted attempt to take a 
different approach in cases involving threats to the environment 
 
 64. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, NOTICE OF COMPLETION OF THE 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT [FOR] 53 WEST 53RD STREET, CEQR 
No. 09DCP004M (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/ 
env_review/53_west_53/notice_completion_feis.pdf (where the impacts of the 
1,250 foot high tower that is the subject of this EIS is justified on the basis that 
a totally theoretically “as-of-right” alternative would have essentially the same 
impacts). 
 65. Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis added). 
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was probably Overton Park, where the Supreme Court held that 
the judiciary was obligated to closely scrutinize a substantive 
decision of the Secretary of Transportation to approve a highway 
through a Memphis Park, when the Federal Highway Act said 
that that could only be justified if there was no prudent and 
feasible alternative.66  One might have thought from that 
decision, and from early NEPA decisions such as Calvert Cliffs, 
that the judiciary recognized the urgency of protecting the 
American landscape and the environmental health of its citizens 
and was prepared to play an expanded role in cases that came 
before it.  Instead, the courts stepped back, or were required to 
step back by decisions of the Supreme Court that, as 
commentators have noted, have reduced environmental litigation 
to little more than a subset of administrative law. 
The handwriting, I think, was on the wall in the second 
Scenic Hudson decision.67  As I have already noted, Judge Oakes 
was prepared to take the step that could have led to a more 
expansive role for the courts in matters of the environment.  He 
was prepared to look at the realities and make the decision that 
the FPC had not treated the preservation of scenic beauty as a 
basic concern.  And he was ready to say that in the circumstances 
of the case, the law, as articulated by the courts, required that 
conservation values be given priority (or at least that they not be 
relegated to a “so-what” status).  Thus, he would not only have 
vacated the license—he would have called an end to the Project 
altogether (rather than remand it to the FPC for yet another 
round of hearings).  That was a decision that he felt it was 
appropriate for the courts to make. 
Judge Hays, on the other hand, who had laid down the 
criterion that the preservation of scenic beauty be treated as a 
basic concern, was unwilling to act on that criterion the second 
time around.  Instead, he retreated to the traditional rules, which 
deferred almost entirely to the agency’s supposed expertise.  As 
long as there was evidence on both sides of the issue, the courts 
had to defer to the agency.  Biases and values and even the state 
 
 66. See generally Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 
(1971). 
 67. See generally Scenic Hudson II, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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of the nation had no bearing; the agencies, not the courts, had 
been given the decision-making role. 
In my view, that is the dogma that continues to operate 
today.  There have, of course, been resounding litigation victories 
in the environmental arena, but few of them have been 
substantive.  Where statutes are involved—and soon after Scenic 
Hudson, statutes became the fundamental and overriding form 
that defined environmental law—courts have regularly held 
agencies to the mandates of the law.  But where discretion is 
involved—where priorities have not been set out in legislation—
the courts have largely maintained a passive role.  The fact that 
environmental quality may be at stake has not made a difference. 
It could have been otherwise.  In their time, judges like 
Skelly Wright, Bazelon, Mansfield and Oakes were willing to 
wade in, to take an active role in shaping the law—one might 
even say in creating it—in the environmental arena.68  But today, 
there seems little enthusiasm among judges to think or act in an 
expansionist way.  And for good reason: the Supreme Court has 
discouraged it.  Still, in his time, Judge Cardozo was able to 
change fundamentally the reach of tort law from his seat on our 
State’s Court of Appeals.  Perhaps one day another Cardozo will 
do that for environmental law. 
Great leaps have, in fact, been made.  I recommend to you 
Oliver Houck’s recent book Taking Back Eden, which recounts 
cases in Japan, the Philippines, India, Russia, and Greece, where 
the judiciary has taken upon itself the role of determining the 
priority of competing values and has handed down decisions, 
many of them constitutionally-based, holding that a Shinto 
temple, the Taj Mahal, a Russian glade or the Philippine forests 
take priority, and if other branches of government are unwilling 
or unable to protect them, the courts will.69  So, too, in Argentina, 
where, commenting on a court decision that ordered the clean up 
of a filthy river running through the poorest part of Buenos Aires, 
 
 68. In addition to Judge Oakes’ dissent in Scenic Hudson II, see, e.g., Calvert 
Cliffs’ Coordinating Council v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d. 1109 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Skelly Wright, J.); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 
F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J.); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 
584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, J.). 
 69. See generally HOUCK, supra note 1. 
27
BUTZEL FINAL-NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:27 AM 
2014] STORM KING REVISITED 397 
 
the chief judge explained the ruling, which many regarded as 
beyond the proper role of the judiciary, by saying rather dryly, 
“the function of the court is to make noise.”70 
It has always been so, from the earliest days of the English 
chancery.  In the United States, it is a role that inevitably raises 
issues of the separation of powers and, indeed, of democracy 
itself.  Yet our courts have risen up to make noise on many 
occasions, not least of all in John Marshall’s seminal 
constitutional rulings and more recently, when the Supreme 
Court set the civil rights revolution in motion in Brown v. Board 
of Education.71  Protection of the environment may seem of lesser 
importance, and in terms of individual rights, that is true.  But in 
terms of the collective—of our society as a whole—the 
implications of a degraded environment—a National treasure 
irrevocably defaced or the continuing loss of the ecosystems that 
sustain us—are equally compelling.  We can hope—and I do 
hope—that you will live to see the courts assume a more active 
role once again.  Or better yet, that some of you will be part of 
making it happen. 
 
 
 70. Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of Environmental Law, 26 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 455-56 (2009) (Fifteenth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture 
on Environmental Law). 
 71. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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